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The administrative process, as a product of modern times, has
emerged as a recognized legal classification in our American juris-
prudence. Its genesis is to be found in the inability of the judicial
process to cope with the multiplied functions of government and
the many social and complex problems brought about by the indus-
trialization and urbanization of our country. Since the administra-
tive process developed as an alternative to the expediency of
solution by executive action, it had for its objective the accom-
plishment of social justice through the expedient of prompt and
administrative action. Accordingly, in its development the admin-
istrative process has clashed with the traditional ideas of what is
right and just as espoused by the Anglo-American judicial tra-
dition. This confrontation resulted in compromises between the
judicial process and the administrative process whereby a balance
was struck which guaranteed substantial justice to the regulated
individual without unduly impeding the expedient administration
by the administrative agencies.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
As a result of the accommodation between the judicial process
and the administrative process it has been recognized that due
process does not necessarily mean judicial process in the manner
of courts of justice, but that administrative process, which is open
to a minimum of judicial review, is, in appropriate cases, as much
due process of law as judicial process.2
The fifth and fourteenth amendments, which forbid Congress
and the states, respectively, from depriving any person of life, lib-
* A.B. 1931, LL.B. 1933, University of San Francisco; LL.D. 1965, Lincoln
University. Presiding Justice, California 'Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
Division One.
1 HART, AN INTRODUCTION To ADmINISTRATIVE LAW [hereinafter cited as HART]
9-10, 461 (2d ed. 1950) ; Hankins, The Necessity for Administrative Notice and Hear-
ing, 25 IOWA L. REv. 457 (1940).
2 HART, supra note 1, at 459-60; Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15,
20, 35 P. 353, 354 (1894).
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erty or property without due process, guarantee no particular form
of procedure-their purport, rather, is to guarantee substantive
rights. Accordingly, down through the years the courts have, by
a case-to-case determination, taken account of the differences in
the particular interest affected, the circumstances involved and the
procedures prescribed by the legislative bodies for dealing with
them-and have determined in each instance whether there has
been a denial of due process.3 The courts have, therefore, made it
clear that underlying all administrative law is the constitutional
precept that public officers must not act arbitrarily, capriciously,
whimsically, unreasonably, fraudulently or dishonestly, and where
they have found administrative action to be arbitrary, oppressive or
unjust, they have struck it down as contrary to due process. 4
The basic essential of procedural due process is that the ad-
ministrative hearing at which facts are to be determined must be
orderly and conducted in a manner meeting the requirements of
fair play, measured by what the courts deem to be fair, just and
appropriate under the circumstances.5 These basic requirements
include the following: There must be a fair and open hearing; the
parties must be apprised of the evidence to be considered; the evi-
dence must be produced at the hearing by witnesses present or
by authenticated documents, maps or photographs; there must be
an opportunity to inspect documents, to cross-examine witnesses
within reasonable limits and to offer evidence in explanation or re-
buttal.6 Administrative agencies, however, are not bound by the
strict rules of evidence which obtain in the courts.' Accordingly,
the standard of admissibility, in the absence of a contrary rule ex-
pressly controlling the proceedings of the particular agency, is that
any relevant evidence is admitted if it is the sort of evidence on
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or
statutory rule which might make improper the admission of such
3 FCC v. WJR, Goodwill Stations, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 277 (1949).
4 2 CAL. JuR. 2d, Administrative Law and Procedure § 38, at 75-79 (1952).
5 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1937); Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) ; Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 141 Cal. App. 2d
446, 455, 296 P.2d 882, 887 (1956); Bandini Estate Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
28 Cal. App. 2d 224, 229-30, 82 P.2d 185, 188-89 (1938).
6 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227
U.S. 88, 91, 93 (1912); La Prada v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47,
51-52, 162 P.2d 13, 16 (1945) ; Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 141 Cal. App.
2d 446, 455, 296 P.2d 882, 887 (1956).
7 Aluisi v. County of Fresno, 178 Cal. App. 2d 443, 451-52, 2 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783
(1960); Jenner v. City Council, 164 Cal. App. 2d 490, 496, 331 P.2d 176, 180-81
(1958); Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 141 Cal. App. 2d 446, 455, 296
P.2d 882, 887 (1956). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1966).
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evidence over objections in civil actions.8 Although rumor or un-
corroborated hearsay is not competent evidence,9 hearsay may be
used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.'i
The principle that the nature of the administrative process is
such that the quality of the evidence before the agency or board need
not measure up to evidence normally introduced in judicial pro-
ceedings is demonstrated in those cases in which the courts have
sanctioned opinion evidence in hearings before local boards." The
rationale of these cases which have permitted opinion evidence in
generalized statements, including the statements of attorneys repre-
senting the involved parties, is that the nature of the hearing itself
evokes such presentation.' 2 Accordingly, it is apparent that the
rubric which runs through the cases discussing the quality of the
evidence before administrative boards and agencies is that the courts
have regarded the weight and sufficiency of the evidence as matters
of administrative discretion and have sustained the decision of the
board or agency if substantial evidence supports it.13
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The history of the development of administrative law discloses
a conflict between those who distrust administrative agencies and
those regarding them as useful and essential instruments of govern-
8 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1966); 2 CAL. JuR. 2d, Administrative Law
and Procedure, § 140, at 242-43 (1952). See Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 611, 615,
150 P.2d 892, 893-94 (1944); Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 251, 187 P. 965, 967
(1920).
9 Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 350 (1942);
Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 321, 313 P.2d 127, 130 (1957)
Jenner v. City Council, 164 Cal. App. 2d 490, 496, 331 P.2d 176, 180 (1953).
1o CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1966); DeMartini v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 215 Cal. App. 2d 787, 809, 30 Cal. Rptr. 668, 680 (1963) ;
Jenner v. City Council, 164 Cal. App. 2d 490, 496, 331 P.2d 176, 180 (1953). In
Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App. 2d 124, 139, 40 Cal. Rptr. 171,
180 (1964), the court held that hearsay which is objectionable may be considered in
support of a finding where no objection is interposed. See also August v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 52, 64, 70 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180 (1968). Contra,
Swegle v. State Bd. of Equalization, 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 439, 270 P.2d 518, 522
(1954) (Dooling, J., concurring); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE 31 (2d ed. 1966).
11 Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. Di Bene, 245 Cal. App. 2d 160, 172, 53
Cal. Rptr. 610, 618 (1966); Iscoff v. Police Comm'n, 222 Cal. App. 2d 395, 410, 35
Cal. Rptr. 184, 199 (1963); Floresta, Inc., v. City Council, 190 Cal. App. 2d 599,
608-09, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187-88 (1961).
12 In Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. Di Bene, 245 Cal. App. 2d 160, 172, 53
Cal. Rptr. 610, 618 (1966), Iscoff v. Police Comm'n, 222 Cal. App. 2d 395, 410, 35
Cal. Rptr. 184, 199 (1963), and Floresta, Inc., v. City Council, 190 Cal. App. 2d 599,
609, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188 (1961), the purpose of the opinion evidence was recognized
to be the weighing of social and public advantages for the issuance of the permit or
zoning variance in question and not as proof of a precise fact.
18 See 'Iscoff v. Police Comm'n, 222 Cal. App. 2d 395, 35 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1963)
Floresta, Inc., v. City Council, 190 Cal. App. 2d 599, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1961).
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ment. Those who distrust these agencies have sought to minimize
their powers by subjecting them to the maximum court review, while
those regarding administrative agencies as necessary and valuable
instruments of law enforcement, although conceding the desirability
of some court review in all cases, have sought to limit court review
so that the utility of the agencies would not be completely frustrated.
In California a serious attempt to reconcile these two points of
view has been made through the use of a special proceeding to ob-
tain judicial review of adjudicatory decisions of state-level govern-
mental agencies. This proceeding, described as "administrative
mandamus," finds the rules for its application in Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1094.5 and, where not inconsistent with that section,
in the provisions governing ordinary mandamus. 14 Under this pro-
ceeding the inquiry extends to whether the agency proceeded with-
out or in excess of its jurisdiction, whether there was a fair hearing
and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. 5 Abuse
of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in
the manner required by law or the order or decision is not supported
by the findings or the findings are not supported by the evidence.' 6
In considering whether an agency has proceeded without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or whether there was a fair hearing the
reviewing court exercises a maximum of judicial review. Under the
due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions the valid-
ity of the substantive provisions of regulatory statutes or regula-
tions and the determination whether the procedures pursuant to
these statutes and regulations were due and just and fairly conducted
are conditioned upon the opinion of judges. This conditioning results
from the position of "judicial supremacy" in which American courts
are placed by virtue of the prerogative they possess under the
American system to interpret the validity of the substantive and
procedural provisions of statutes and regulations. 7 Upon the same
basis courts exercise maximum review in cases where the inquiry
on review is whether the respondent agency has abused its discretion
in not proceeding in the manner required by law or whether the
order or decision is supported by the findings.
14 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1084-86 (West 1955), 1087 (West Supp. 1969),
1088-94 (West 1955), 1095 (West Supp. 1969), 1096-97 (West 1955), 1107-09 (West
Supp. 1969), 1110-10(b) (West 1955).
15 CAL. 'CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5(b) (West 1955); Le Strange v. City of
.Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1962). See CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, XV (Cal. Cont. Ed. of the Bar 1966).
16 Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550,
555. See CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra note 15, at xv.
1 HART, supra note 1, at 459-60.
1970]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the
evidence, instances arise where there is a maximum of judicial review
and those where the review is minimum. In cases in which the
superior court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judg-
ment18 on the evidence the court exercises its judicial supremacy
because it determines whether the findings are supported by the
weight of the evidence. 9 If the superior court determines that the
findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence, abuse of
discretion is established." Thus in California as a result of statute
or decisional law the "independent judgment" test is applied where
the administrative adjudication affected a vested right and the ad-
judicating agency was a state-level agency of legislative origin."'
In cases where the superior court is not authorized by law to
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence the review may
be said to be minimal. In such cases the applicable test is the "sub-
stantial evidence" test.2 Under this test the superior court is re-
stricted to determining whether the findings of the administrative
agency are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the
whole record.a Accordingly, in California this test is applied to deci-
sions of administrative agencies affecting non-vested rights, regard-
less of the type of state agency, constitutional agencies and local
agencies .21
Apropos the required test on a review of the evidence, it should
be noted here that when the superior court has rendered its judg-
ment on mandamus and the judgment is appealed, the appellate
court is governed by the substantial evidence rule. Its scope of re-
view is to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the respondent, sustains the findings made by the trial
court. This rule applies whether the appellate court is reviewing the
findings of the superior court where that court has exercised inde-
pendent judgment or whether the findings involve the decision of the
18 This test is variously referred to as the "independent judgment test," the
"weight of the evidence test," the "trial de novo test," and the "limited trial de
novo test." CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra note 15, at 64-65.
19 Under the "independent judgment test" the superior court is not confined to
the agency record but may receive additional evidence. Dare v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 795, 797-800, 136 P.2d 304, 307-10 (1943).
20 CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1094.5(c) (West 1955) ; Le Strange v. City of Berkeley,
210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1962).
21 See discussion and analysis in CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra
note 15, at 65-67, and statutes and cases cited and reviewed therein.
22 'CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra note 15, at 65.
as CAL. CODE Cxv. PROC. § 1094.5(c) (West 1955); Le Strange v. City of
Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320-21, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1962); CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra note 15, at 65.
24 See discussion and analysis in CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS, supra
note 15, at 74-86, and statutes and cases cited therein.
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local administrative agency. Where the trial court has properly
exercised its independent judgment the reviewing court is confined
to the evidence received by the superior court; where the superior
court has been required to apply the substantial evidence test the
appellate court is limited to the evidence in the agency record. 5
CRIMINAL PROCESS
Although, as pointed out above, due process is not in all cases
necessarily judicial process, criminal process must be judicial pro-
cess." In recent times the growing awareness of individual rights
which are constitutionally protected has eroded the traditional dis-
tinctions made upon the basis that an administrative proceeding is a
"civil action" and consequently not governed by legal doctrine in
the criminal law area.
In the landmark case of In re Gault,2' which extended the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to juvenile court de-
linquency hearings, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that
the privilege against self-incrimination can be claimed in any pro-
ceeding, be it criminal, civil, administrative or judicial.28 This priv-ilege, when invoked, carries with it the guarantee that the person who
exercises the right to remain silent shall suffer no penalty for such
silence. 19 Accordingly, in this context "penalty" is not restricted to
fine or imprisonment, but includes the imposition of any sanction
which makes asserting of the privilege "costly." 30 In Spevack v.
Klein,3 the United States Supreme Court held, in a review of a dis-
barment proceeding, that the privilege against self-incrimination
extends to proceedings where the deprivation of a livelihood can
result as a price for asserting it.
In the light of the foregoing principles declared by the United
States Supreme Court which have applied the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, it would appear that the right to assert the privilege
25 Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal. 2d 301, 308-09, 196 P.2d 20, 25(1948) ; Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 321, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550,555 (1962) ; Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 193, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515,
527 (1962); Endo v. State Bd. of Equalization, 143 Cal. App. 2d 395, 399, 300 P.2d
366, 368-69 (1956).
26 HART, supra note 1, at 460.
27 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28 Id. at 47-50; see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)
(White, J., concurring).
29 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
30 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 614 (1965).
31 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967).
1970]
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against self-incrimination may be asserted in any administrative
proceeding where there may be an imposition of any sanction which
makes the assertion of the privilege "costly" to the person invoking
the privilege. In view of the holding in Spevack, is the revocation of
a license a "costly" penalty so as to permit the licensee the right
to assert the privilege in disciplinary proceedings? Is the provision
in California Government Code section 11513, subdivision (c), that
in hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act32 a respondent
who has not testified in his own behalf may be called and examined
as if under cross-examination, tempered by the holding in Spevack?
In Goss v. Department of Motor Vehicles,3 3 the California
Court of Appeal held that since a motor vehicle license suspension
hearing conducted by the Department of Motor Vehicles was not
criminal in nature the licensee was subject to be called and cross-
examined by the hearing officer. The opinion does not disclose
whether the licensee invoked the privilege against self-incrimination,
but it does state that the licensee's own testimony provided sufficient
evidence to support the Department's suspension order. 34 Goss may
be distinguishable from Spevack on the basis that in Goss the pen..
alty involved was the privilege to drive a motor vehicle, while in
Spevack the penalty was the dishonor of disbarment and the de-
privation of a livelihood.35 The validity of such a distinction will
depend, it seems, upon the interpretation placed in future cases as
to what was meant by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. California"
when it referred to the imposition of any sanction which makes as-
sertion of the fifth amendment privilege "costly." Such interpreta-
tion will also bring into question the holding in Goldberg v. Regents
of the University of California37 that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not have to be recognized in disciplinary pro-
ceedings contemplating suspension or dismissal brought against
university students pursuant to procedures and rules of evidence
adopted by the University. In Goldberg the appellate court specif-
ically noted that the more recent federal cases38 hold that attend-
ance in a state university is no longer a privilege but is now
32 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11370-11528 (West 1966).
33 264 'Cal. App. 2d 268, 70 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1968).
34No petition for a hearing in the California Supreme Court was filed. Goss v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 268, 270, 70 Cal. Rptr. 447, 448
(1968).
35 Apparently the argument could be made in a given case that the suspension or
revocation of the privilege to drive a motor vehicle results in the deprivation of liveli-
hood.
36 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
37 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 883, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 474-75 (1967).
38 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961);
Knight v. State Bd. of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
[Vol. 10
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regarded as an important benefit.39 The question postulated, then,
in view of the federal decisions, is whether the loss of such a bene-
fit is "costly" within the meaning of Griffin and Spevack.
In the area of search and seizure the question has been pos-
tulated whether the policy of excluding evidence seized by an un-
lawful search and seizure applies to administrative hearings.4" In
People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe,41 the California Supreme Court
applied the exclusionary rule to proceedings for forfeiture of prop-
erty, which are civil in nature, upon the rationale that such pro-
ceedings bear "a close identity to the aims and objects of criminal
enforcement" and that "on policy the same exclusionary rules
should apply to improper state conduct whether the proceeding
contemplates the deprivation of one's liberty or property."42 This
rationale was assumed to be applicable to an administrative hearing
where the proceeding contemplates the deprivation of a license in
Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners.4" Although not specifically
required to pass upon the question since no evidence resulting from
a search and seizure was actually admitted into evidence, the ap-
pellate court made that assumption when it observed that the
deprivation of a license to practice medicine which was contem-
plated in the administrative proceeding under review would result
in the deprivation of a property right. In view of the holding in the
Cadillac case, as interpreted by Elder, it appears that it is now the
law in California that the policy of excluding evidence seized by
unlawful search and seizure applies to administrative proceedings
which contemplate the deprivation of property or a property right.44
39 Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 875-76,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 (1967).
40 Pierce v. Board of Nursing Education & Nurse Registration, 255 Cal. App.
2d 463, 466, 63 Cal. Rptr. 107, 109 (1967). Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241
Cal. App. 2d 246, 260, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304, 315 (1966); Thorp v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 175 Cal. App. 2d 489, 492, 346 P.2d 433, 436 (1959).
41 62 Cal. 2d 92, 41 'Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964).
42 Id. at 96-97, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
43 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 260, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304, 315 (1966).
44 The basis upon which the exclusionary rule was held not to apply to ad-
ministrative proceedings contemplating license revocation was that the state had a
right to inspect and investigate the business of the licensee. See Cooley v. State Bd.
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 141 Cal. App. 2d 293, 298, 296 P.2d 588, 591
(1956). Apparently this rationale has now been dissipated by recent United States
Supreme Court decisions which hold that administrative searches by municipal health
and safety inspectors constitute significant intrusions upon interests protected by the
fourth amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) ; See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967). These cases hold that a citizen is entitled to
refuse entry to the inspector unless there is a prior judicial determination of the
reasonableness of the inspection as evidenced by a search warrant. In light of these
decisions it is doubtful that the right to make regulatory inspections without a
warrant continues. See also Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967) (search of welfare recipient's home to seek out welfare fraud).
1970]
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If evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure may not
be admitted in an administrative proceeding, does not the criminal
law doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona,45 that a person is entitled to be advised of his
right to remain silent and that he is entitled to counsel, apply in
administrative proceedings? In In re Acuna,41 the California Court
of Appeal held that the constitutional warnings expressed in
Miranda, as well as those expounded in Escobedo47 and Dorado,4s
do not apply to juvenile court litigation. Acuna was decided prior
to Gault, which applied the Miranda doctrine to a juvenile court
proceeding. In view of Gault it now seems clear that the rationale
utilized by Acuna, that a juvenile court proceeding should be
treated as a civil proceeding, is no longer valid.
PREHEARING DISCOVERY
In Shively v. Stewart49 the California Supreme Court held that
although the Administrative Procedure Act50 contains no express
provisions authorizing prehearing discovery in administrative pro-
ceedings," 1 such discovery may be had under appropriate circum-
stances upon the rationale that the legislature has left to the courts,
as in the case of criminal discovery, the question whether modern
concepts of administrative adjudication call for common law rules
to permit and regulate the use of the agencies' subpoena power to
secure prehearing discovery.52 In support of this conclusion the
reviewing court observed that "[s]tatutory administrative pro-
cedures have been augmented with common law rules whenever it
appeared necessary to promote fair hearings and effective judicial
review." 53 Accordingly, "the specific holding in Shively is that the
45 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46 245 Cal. App. 2d 388, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
47 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
48 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
49 65 Cal. 2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966).
50 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11501-24 (West 1966).
51 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT (1944); Com-
ment, Discovery Prior to Administrative Adjudications-A Statutory Proposal, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 823 (1964).
52 Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 478-79, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1966).
53 Id. at 479, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 219. See Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 19
Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962); Fascination, Inc., v. Hoover, 39 Cal. 2d 260, 246 P.2d 656(1952) ; English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155, 217 P.2d 22 (1950).
"These cases illustrate Professor Davis' observation that the law determining the
adequacy of administrative hearings 'is mostly judge-made law . . .' and 'the standards
are essentially the same whether judges are giving content to due process, whether they
are giving meaning to inexplicit statutory provisions, or whether they are developing
a kind of common law.' " Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 479, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217,
219 (1966) [citing K. DAvis, 1 AD NisTRATivE LAW TREATISE 506 (1958)].
[Vol. 10
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subpoena duces tecum authorized by section 11510 of the Govern-
ment Code may be used for discovery purposes and is not restricted
to the obtaining of evidence to be used at the hearing." '54
Although Shively announced the broad principle that courts
can apply common law rules whenever it appears necessary to pro-
mote fair hearings and effective judicial review, that principle was
restricted in its application to cases in which the criminal law anal-
ogy is appropriate.5 5 In Shively, the petitioners seeking discovery
were physicians who were facing disciplinary proceedings which
could have resulted in revocation of their licenses to practice. Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court, noting that a disciplinary proceeding
has a punitive character, held that the petitioners were entitled to
prehearing discovery of the written statements of witnesses and
copies of petitioners' writings with respect to treatment given the
women upon whom they were alleged to have performed abortions.
Subsequent to Shively, Everett v. Gordon5" reiterated the rule
that the form of discovery in administrative proceedings is limited
to that akin to discovery allowed in criminal proceedings, with the
observation that "[t]he principle upon which Shively is based is
that the accused in a disciplinary proceeding should have the same
rights of discovery as the accused in a criminal proceeding. 5 7
Effective November 13, 1968, sections 11507.5 and 11507.6
were added to the Government Code, providing for the exclusive
right to and method of discovery in any proceeding governed by
the adjudication provisions5 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
These provisions are those which deal with hearings which deter-
mine whether a right, authority, license or privilege should be
revoked, suspended, limited or conditioned.59 In Romero v. Hem 0
the appellate court compared the discovery provided for in section
11507.6 with the discovery theretofore allowed by Shively and
Everett in administrative proceedings and concluded that there was
practically no difference between the two methods, except that sec-
tion 11507.6 eliminates the requirement of showing good cause
for obtaining the information required by the section to be dis-
closed, while under the Shively rule good cause to receive it must
be shown as to some of the information."1 In Romero the reviewing
54 Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 670, 72 Cal. Rptr. 379, 381 (1968).
55 65 Cal. 2d 475, 479, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1966).
56 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 72 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968).
57 Id. at 670, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
58 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11500-28 (West 1966).
59 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11503-04 (West 1966).
60 276 A.C.A. 947, 81 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1969).
61 Id. at 953, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
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court held that, although neither Shively nor Everett discusses the
right to interrogatories, and although section 11507.6 does not
mention interrogatories, no logical reason exists why interrogatories
cannot be used for the production of evidentiary material properly
subject to discovery.6 2
A study of Shively, Everett and Romero discloses that each
of these cases dealt with administrative disciplinary proceedings
wherein the petitioners were subject to the loss of the license to
engage in their respective professions or occupations. These cases
were apparently articulating the same rationale that was stated in
Griffin, Spevack, Cadillac and Elder that, where administrative pro-
ceedings bear a close identity to the aims and objects of criminal
enforcement and contemplate the deprivation of one's liberty, prop-
erty or property rights, the procedural safeguards which are appro-
priate in criminal cases are by analogy appropriate in administra-
tive proceedings. This rationale appears, also, to have been carried
into section 11507.6, since that section deals with discovery in
proceedings which contemplate the suspension, revocation or limi-
tation of a right, license or privilege.
In sum, discovery has now been extended to administrative
proceedings where the criminal law analogy is appropriate. While
such prehearing discovery is now provided for by statute in ad-
ministrative adjudications under the Administrative Procedure Act,
it seems clear that under the rationale of Shively prehearing dis-
covery is likewise available in administrative proceedings not en-
compassed by the Administrative Procedure Act where the crim-
inal law analogy is appropriate.
DISCERNIBLE TRENDS
It is apparent that there is a trend in the law which is affecting
administrative proceedings. Although this trend may appear to
some to tend toward making the administrative process excessively
legalistic and technical, it is apparent that the significant directions
have been in the area of administrative process, which bears a
close identity to the criminal process. This trend is in keeping with
the recognized principle that while due process is not in all cases
judicial process, criminal process must be judicial process if it is
to satisfy the requirements of the due process clauses of the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution. Accordingly,
because of the growing awareness of rights which are constitutionally




basis that an administrative proceeding is a "civil action" and
therefore not governed by legal doctrine have yielded to the su-
premacy of the legal doctrine where the administrative process
can result in the deprivation of liberty, property or property rights.
NEW DIRECTIONS
The California cases have consistently emphasized that the
administrative hearing at which facts are to be determined must
be orderly and conducted in a manner meeting the requirements
of fair play. Accordingly, the courts will continue to perform the
important function of determining whether certain procedures prac-
ticed by administrative agencies provide procedural due process.
It is not uncommon for a reviewing court to be presented in
cases involving local boards and agencies with a meager and ob-
scure record, and sometimes no record at all, of the proceedings
before such boards and agencies. In this situation the appellate
court finds it difficult and, in some instances impossible, to deter-
mine whether substantial evidence has been presented to the
agency or whether there has been a deprivation of procedural due
process. In such cases the reviewing court is left no alternative
but to affirm the decision of the agency on the basis of the legalistic
presumption of regularity which prevails in the absence of counter-
vailing evidence. Sometimes the establishment of a record is at-
tempted through the unsatisfactory method of recreating in the
superior court the evidence adduced before the agency.
Since hearings held by local boards and commissions are, more
often than not, presided over by persons who are not lawyers, they
may not be as sensitive to the demands of due process or the normal
routine of law as they would be if presided over by lawyers. It is
a matter of common knowledge, moreover, that many local boards,
agencies and commissions consider lobbying through individual
pressure, group pressure or mass pressure to be consistent with
the proper functions of their office. This pressure is often exerted
outside the formal hearings. One can only speculate as to the
effect of this pressure on controversial matters in which the local
board or agency must act in a quasi-judicial capacity. Certainly,
the record before the reviewing court will not include what a mem-
ber of the board or agency may have considered as "evidence"
when such came to him outside the formal hearing, and, hence,
is dehor's the record.
Obviously we cannot expect that boards and commissions be
composed entirely of lawyers. But we can expect that boards and
commissions acting in a quasi-judicial capacity function as admin-
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istrative courts. On the local level it seems expedient that the com-
munities should provide their boards and commissions with hearing
officers who shall have been admitted to practice law in this state.
The efficacy of the hearing officer procedure has been abundantly
demonstrated on the state level with respect to the agencies under
the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act.63 The hearing
officer provides the impartiality of a fair hearing since his function
is to separate judging from accusing. 4 It is his function to rule on
the admission or exclusion of evidence and to advise the agency
on matters of law.65 He may hear the matter alone or the agency
may hear the matter with him.66 If he hears the matter alone it is
his duty to prepare a proposed decision which the agency may
adopt as its own; if the agency itself hears the case, the hearing
officer presides at the hearing and rules on the admission and
exclusion of evidence.6 7 A valuable function of the hearing officer
procedure is that it provides for an adequate record and thus as-
sures that the agency's decision stands scrutiny in the light of the
record and the record alone. In sum, this procedure is not only
time saving and conducive to an expeditious hearing, but it brings
the judicial approach to the meaning of the law and rules admin-
istered by the agencr. 8
It is also incumbent that the bench, bar, the legislature and
the citizenry coordinate their efforts to remove from the administra-
tive law of our state the unrealistic and impractical distinctions
which have caused no small measure of confusion in the administra-
tive process. These are the distinctions based upon legislative and
constitutional provisions and the decisional law which provide for
court review in some types of administrative decisions and no
review at all in others, but instead a complete retrial in the supe-
rior court, where even on issues of fact the administrative decision
is given no weight at all. These are the distinctions which require
the substantial evidence test in some situations and the independent
judgment test in others. Thus the courts are permitted to substitute
themselves for the agency where the administrative adjudication
affected vested rights and the adjudicating agency was a state level
agency of legislative origin; but we restrict the courts to the sub-
stantial evidence test where the administrative decisions affected
non-vested rights, regardless of the type of agency, where the deci-
63 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11502 (West 1966).
64 Kuchman, The Role of the Hearing Officer-a Private Practitioner's Point oj
View, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1956).
65 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11512(b) (West 1966).
66 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11512(a) (West 1966).
67 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11512, 11517 (West 1966).
68 See Kuchman, supra note 64, at 212.
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sions, even though involving vested rights, are those of administra-
tive agencies of constitutional origin and where the administrative
decisions are those of local agencies. These distinctions appear
unnecessary when we consider that the substantial evidence test is
broad and flexible enough to enable a reviewing court to correct
whatever ascertainable abuses may have arisen in the. administra-
tive adjudication. Moreover, this test recognizes the proper role of
the administrative agency.
CONCLUSION
The role of the courts in the area of administrative process
should be one of supervision and control to prevent abuse, un-
fairness and arbitrary action in administrative proceedings. It
should not, however, substitute itself for the agency or perform
the agency's function. Each-the court and the agency-has its
well-defined sphere of action. The court should review administra-
tive decisions where there is a claim of errors in law, arbitrary
findings of fact, and failure to follow procedure prescribed by law,
or a deprivation of due process. The agency, in turn, should have
the power to make decisions of disputed issues of fact with some
degree of finality, and administrative findings should be deemed
final if there is substantial evidence to support them. Accordingly,
with respect to issues of fact, the role of the court should be one
of review to determine whether the findings of the agency are sup-
ported by substantial evidence and not to reweigh the evidence
and thus submit its judgment for that of the agency. When the
court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency, it reduces the
agency's administrative hearing to nothing more than waste motion.
In these days when court calendars are congested and court delays
are a matter of grave concern, courts should not be called upon to
do the agency's work all over again.
It is now an accepted fact, after three decades of experimenta-
tion, that administrative law is here to stay and that by a steady
and pragmatic growth it has emerged as a recognized classification
in our jurisprudence. Since the administrative process determines
controversies, declares rights, interprets statutes and rules and in-
flicts penalties, it performs the same fundamental task as the
courts. Since they perform a common task, the court and the
agency must function in a system which recognizes that each has
a proper role. This role demands of the agency that it function
like a court because, in essence, it is truly an administrative court.
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